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In recent years, digital developers have shifted away from stand-alone apps
towards more integrated and centralised platforms. Focussed on Kenya, LSE’s
Dr Laura Mann draws on new research to explain why policy-makers should
take notice of profound re-organisations taking place in global agriculture
networks, and the balance of power between public and private actors.
This is the second of four posts presenting key insights from the research project
‘A Tale of Two Green Valleys’ at the LSE Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa, which
examines data-driven agro-innovation in California’s Central Valley and Kenya’s
Rift Valley.
As an observer and interviewer of tech  rms in Kenya’s Silicon Savannah over the past
ten years, I have seen many  rms come and go, with new entrants often trying to
replicate the functionalities and business models of their predecessors. The hard
reality is that it is extremely di cult to scale up a stand-alone app, independent of
larger institutional actors or social networks. It is even more challenging when your
app is aimed at farmers, who are often older, more rural and less wealthy than your
typical Nairobi or San Franciscan urbanite. Spreading the word – and then getting
farmers to understand and embed your app within their growing and business
activities – is a hugely challenging undertaking.
Over the past few years, we have thus observed a shift in the aspirations of digital
developers to move away from stand-alone applications towards a new strategy of
platformisation, or the roll-out of an integrated, consolidated platform upon which
individual apps can integrate and scale.
As other scholars have described, platforms have both potential positive and negative
attributes, depending on your perspective. On the one hand, the platform architecture
offers ‘openness’ and ‘interoperability’ thereby allowing smaller players to scale up and
avoid replication. On the other hand, ‘platformisation’ also produces network effects
as it allows one dominant platform operator to capitalise on the innovation of others
and strengthen its overall market share in the process. Additionally, as scholars such
as Nick Srnicek and Jonas Andersson Schwartz have argued, platforms also ‘embody
a politics’ as operators control the terms of market entry and participation, and are
able to reshape economic relationships and rationalities in the process.
In rural Kenya, Safaricom, the globally known mobile money leader, is at the forefront
of this platformisation of the agricultural sector. It converted its existing Corporate
Social Responsibility initiative, M-Agri, into a commercial operation in 2017 to launch
Digifarm, a platform that it hopes will integrate a whole suite of applications including
Arifu, an agronomic advice platform; Farmdrive, a  ntech that uses M-Pesa activity to
derive credit scores and eligibility for loans in the form of vouchers for agricultural
inputs; and iProcure, an input supplier that redeems those vouchers. Through these
partnerships and others, Safaricom hopes to offer farmers credit and insurance tied to
speci c inputs and designated buyers for their goods. It seeks to scale and encourage
adoption through a mix of mobile phones and a physical network of Digifarm Village
Advisors (DVA) and Digisoko points. The latter are hubs that provide proprietary inputs
and recruit labourers in key farming areas and the former includes ‘last mile’ agents,
paid on commission, and who advise farmers on Digifarm services, providing, in the
words of Digifarm’s executive, ‘an extension service that people can see’.
The aspiration for integration and consolidation is partly shaped by frustrations with
past failures of replication mentioned above, but it is also linked to the emergence of
new approaches within economics, such as those emphasising behavioural change or
favouring randomised control trials as a gold standard for development evidence and
policy-making. In essence, the realisation of a centralised and widely used platform
would allow platform operators – and the economists with whom they work – to
create a kind of neural network through which they could carry out experiments and
learn about farmers, farming and Kenyan producers and consumers more generally.
A series of partner  eld days held in Kenya, September 2018 allowed non-pro t
CIMMYT to share the latest developments in maize and wheat
research. Photographer: Jerome Bossuet/CIMMYT (CC BY-NC 2.0).
In many ways, these aspirations for top-down control and legibility are similar to those
of the colonial and independence eras, in that they seek to lock farmers into legible
systems through which they can ensure the repayment of debts, reduce the risks of
investment and provide stable and predictable demand and supply for input providers
and aggregators. For example, in the 1960s, colonial policy-makers used cooperatives
and marketing boards to impose extensive farm plans, which speci ed which crops
could be grown and which methods should be used. They empowered these marketing
boards or preferred agro-processers to act as monopsonies, automatically deducting
the costs of inputs and loan repayments from sales transactions and using the
proceeds to  nance public goods such as extension o cers and research (for an
overview of this period, see here and here).
In this way, platformisation appears to be sending rural Kenya ‘back to the future’.
However, there are a number of important differences between contemporary coercive
systems and those of the past, which are worth highlighting for scholars and
observers of development theory and practice.
First, these systems are obviously being built within the private sector, rather than the
public sector. While it is too early to know how these systems will evolve, we might
anticipate that such private control will likely gear regulatory oversight and governance
goals towards the interests of private actors and shareholders and powerful donors,
and away from broader public interest concerns.
Second, platform operators are currently embedded within a scholarly community that
seeks to perform – and effectively coerce – behaviour according to micro-economic
theories of development rather than the structural development economics of the
1950s-1970s. In their view,  nancial resources are not to be mobilised collectively or
strategically; rather, gains should  ow directly to the farmers who produce them.
Indeed, many of our interviewees quietly acknowledged that platformisation might
lead to more pronounced rural differentiation through which the most productive
farmers would drive out less productive farmers, and thus create larger, more
commercially viable farms and farmers. In this way, platformisation is not just
changing behaviour and economic  ows of value but changing the context in which
debates around economic theory and policy-making are being contested and
‘performed’.
Finally, the Digifram infrastructure differs markedly from traditional marketing boards
and public extension services in that DVAs and Digisoko agents are not public
employees whose quali cations provide bargaining power within an industrial relation
and who accumulate knowledge and expertise through their work. Rather, these
agents function primarily as social infrastructures that will connect farmers with the
propriety knowledge embedded within the platform itself.
In this way, these platforms re ect broader tendencies within digitisation and
globalisation to restructure production in ways that re-organise production for the
bene t of capital, transferring mental processes away from workers onto non-human
platforms and more centralised pockets of private expertise. In the context of rural
Kenya, developers hope platformisation will obviate the need for distributed
investment into training and thus reduce the risks of industrial action and/or
politicisation of extension. This quality makes platformisation attractive to donors
who may perceive government programs to be ine cient and prone to
mismanagement, and who are keen to  nd ways of delivering services like agricultural
extension and healthcare to remote communities more cheaply (interestingly, our
wider study uncovered similar desires by US technologists to digitize University of
California extension amidst similar budgetary constraints). At the same time, it may
deepen international divisions of labour between agricultural producing regions and
those producing the expertise and innovation deployed within agriculture.
Thus, while public commentators on platforms and digital apps typically focus on the
bene ts in terms of e ciency gains and reductions in transaction costs, observers
and policy-makers should be aware of these more profound re-organisations taking
place in the background; shifts in the balance of power between public and private
actors, and re-organisations in the division of knowledge and power within agricultural
global production networks more generally. By integrating market governance into
single platforms, there is a growing danger of monopoly power and control over
market entry and participation.
Read the full series based on research  ndings from the project A Tale of Two Valleys.
Photo: Close-up to SeedAssure App testing in the  eld Kiboko. Credit: Photographer:
Jerome Bossuet/CIMMYT. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.
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